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Judicial Selection in Rhode Island:
Assessing the Experience with "Merit
Selection": Response
Emily J. Sack*
We owe these presenters great thanks for providing us with
such careful studies of judicial selection in Rhode Island. What
the papers make clear, however, is that the results of the merit
selection process over the past fifteen years are mixed at best.1
This leads to several important questions that we must consider if
we are to move forward in improving judicial selection and the
judiciary in Rhode Island.
First, are we using the right measures? Are the studies using
categories which capture the characteristics that we think
demonstrate quality judging? The speakers have acknowledged
that there are limits to the measurements that they have utilized.
For example, as Mirya Holman notes, such characteristics as
collegiality and efficiency, which likely are relevant, are not
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Michael Yelnosky and the editors of the Roger Williams
University Law Review for their work in organizing this important
Symposium.
1. See, e.g., Mirya R. Holman, Measuring Merit in Rhode Island's
NaturalExperiment in Judicial Selection, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 705,
727 (2010) ("[T]he change to a traditional merit selection system has had very
few effects on traditional measures of judicial quality."); Michael J. Yelnosky,
The Impact of "Merit Selection" on the Characteristics of Rhode Island
Judges, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 649, 656 (2010) ("[M]erit selection
appears to have had little if any impact on several of the background
characteristics I studied"). Professor Yelnosky notes that the percentage of
the judiciary that previously served as legislators or counsel to a legislative
leader significantly declined post-merit selection, which may be significant,
since concern about influence of the legislature on the judiciary was a
motivating factor for the change to a merit selection system. Id. at 654-55.
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included in the studies. 2 In addition, there are qualities such as
integrity, respect and judicial temperament that are difficult to
capture quantitatively.
The question is whether there is a way to undertake a
qualitative study which could assess these less objective, but
highly important, components of effective judging. There would be
some significant challenges in gathering helpful data from such a
study.
First, it would be difficult to devise a comparative
experimental model for the study, which contrasts pre-merit
Unlike the
selection views with post-merit selection views.
quantitative measures, less objective measures of judges are
difficult to capture retroactively. In addition, a qualitative study
would involve interviews with various constituencies in the court
system, including members of the Bar. It likely would be difficult

to convince attorneys who appear before the judges involved to
speak openly and honestly about them. Despite guarantees of
anonymity on the part of the researchers, many attorneys would
fear that their statements would ultimately be attributed, and
particularly in a small state like Rhode Island, any negative
comments about the bench could be devastating to a legal career.
To avoid being merely anecdotal, such a qualitative study would
require numerous interviews, not only of attorneys, but also of
litigants, court employees, and others who have contact with the
judiciary. Assuming that it would be possible to identify these
parties and gain their consent to participate, such a study would
likely be very expensive and resource-intensive.
With all of these challenges, it is unlikely that such a
comprehensive qualitative research study will be completed.
Without that qualitative data, we need to do our best with the
quantitative studies that we have. And of course, much in these
studies is very helpful to our understanding of the results of merit
selection. Some of the measures used are directly informative,
such as the effect of merit selection on racial and gender diversity
on the bench. Moreover, many of the measures are really proxies
for the types of qualitative characteristics that we are trying to
capture - intelligence, strength of legal analysis, decision-making
2. Holman, supra note 1, at 728; see also Rachel Paine Caufield, What
Makes Merit Selection Different?, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 765, 779-80
(2010) (noting that characteristics measuring quality of judges is "necessarily
incomplete").
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skills, and integrity. Therefore, while the data with which we are
working may not be comprehensive, and more qualitative
information would no doubt enrich the research, I think it is
reasonable for us to assume at this point that what the studies are
telling us is true. But if it is true that there appears to be
minimal or little change in most of the measures of judicial quality
pre- and post-merit selection, that leads us to the important and
most obvious issue, which is to explore why this should be the
case.
Why has there been little change in judicial quality since
Rhode Island adopted a merit-based process for selecting its
judiciary? The speakers today have already given several possible
explanations, and I will review them briefly. One answer is that
merit selection is only as good as the people doing the selecting.
As John Marion and others today have suggested, there may be
serious problems with the way in which members of the Judicial
Nominating Commission are named, along with its composition
and process. 3 If political patronage and cronyism infect the merit
selection process, it will generate results similar to those produced
by the more direct political patronage system that previously
existed.
Secondly, we need to learn more about the characteristics of
the pool of applicants since merit selection has been in effect. The
applicant pool naturally can impact the quality of the nominees
who emerge from the process, and a pool that does not vary
significantly from pre-merit selection potential candidates, will
not produce significantly different nominees. If this is a possible
explanation, then we must consider why it may be that the pool of
potential candidates has not changed, or not changed enough, to
impact the results of the process.
Alternatively, if the
characteristics of the applicant pool have in fact changed, but
these characteristics are not reflected in the nominees that
actually emerge from the selection system, we then need to focus
on the process by which applicants are evaluated and ultimately
selected. This involves learning more information about both the
Rhode Island Bar and about the pool of applicants for judicial
appointments, in order to compare both of these groups'
3. John Marion, Judging How We Pick Judges: Fifteen Years of Merit
Selection in Rhode Island, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 735, 751-52 (2010).
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characteristics to the candidates actually nominated for
judgeships. Unfortunately, publicly available information about
both the composition of the Bar and the judicial applicant pool is
currently limited. 4 We have to know more about the breadth and
depth both of the Rhode Island Bar, and of the judicial applicant
pool, to understand the results of the judicial selection process.
For example, Michael Yelnosky's study demonstrates that
both before and after the merit selection system was implemented,
over half of the Rhode Island judiciary graduated from just two
law schools, Suffolk University School of Law and Boston
University School of Law. 5 To better understand the meaning of
that finding, it would be helpful to know what percentage of the
Rhode Island Bar, as well as what percentage of the judicial
applicant pool, graduated from these law schools. Professor
Yelnosky also finds that a relatively low percentage of the
judiciary, both pre- and post-merit selection, attended what his
study designates as elite law schools. 6 Does this correlate with
the make-up of the Bar itself? Does it track the composition of the
applicant pool? Do the characteristics of the applicant pool vary
significantly from those of the Bar as a whole? The interpretation
of this finding from Professor Yelnosky's study would be very
different, depending on the answer to these questions. It would be
very helpful to be able to compare data from these three separate
groups: the Bar as a whole, the judicial applicant pool, and those
actually selected to become judges. This comparison would enable
us to track the different phases of the judicial selection process
and to better identify where, if at all, merit selection is not
4. See, e.g., Marion, supra note 3, at 751 (noting that Commission does
not uniformly report statistics on applicants); Yelnosky, supra note 1, at 653

(Rhode Island Bar association does not maintain records of racial or ethnic
background of its members).
5. Yelnosky, supra note 1, at 651, 654 (pre-merit selection, the
percentage of judges who attended either of these schools was 61%, while
post-merit selection, the percentage was 51.9%). However, the percentage of
those attending each of these schools shifted. Pre-merit selection, the
percentage of judges who attended Boston University School of Law was
32.2%, and the percentage who attended Suffolk University School of Law
was 28.8%; post-merit selection, these numbers had changed to 14.8% and
37%, respectively. Id. at 651, 653-54.
6. See Yelnosky, supra note 1, at 654 (pre-merit selection, 16.9% of the
judiciary attended an elite law school, while post-merit selection, this
percentage declined to 11.1%).
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working as devised.
Another issue to explore concerning the applicant pool is its
size. If, as has been suggested today, the size of the pool has been
quite small in recent years, this will provide fewer opportunities to
increase diversity and improve the quality of our judiciary. We
need to explore why the number of applicants might be small.
Stephen Carlotti suggested that the length and detail of the
application that is required by the process may deter applicants. I
have not seen the application itself, but based on my knowledge of
the application process in the federal system and in other states, I
do not find that explanation convincing. In my experience, the
judicial selection process in many jurisdictions requires highly
detailed and long applications, which include a great deal of
personal disclosure, and there does not seem to be the same level
of deterrence that is proposed as an explanation here.
Another possible explanation might be something I would
term a "holdover effect." Our current system may or may not still
be affected by political cronyism, but let us assume for these
purposes that it is not. However, in considering the size of the
applicant pool, it is equally important to understand how potential
candidates perceive the current process. Even if the current
system has changed, it may take a long time for eligible potential
candidates to believe and have faith in the new process. If
potential applicants believe that the system is tainted and that
selection is not truly based on merit, then they may be
discouraged from applying for judicial positions. The number of
applicants may be low, and the best candidates in particular may
be deterred from applying if they consider that the system has not
really changed. If this is a misimpression, then we can hope that
it is only a matter of time before the "holdover effect" dissipates
and the number and quality of applicants increase. However, we
also have to consider whether the size of the applicant pool
reflects not just a perception, but a reality about the selection
process. If in fact the system has not truly changed and is not
actually based on merit, this may explain the small number of
applicants. Whether the problem is one of appearance or reality,
the small size of the applicant pool is a real concern, and
something that must be carefully monitored and examined.
For all of these reasons, the lack of change in judicial quality
that the studies have found may indicate that our current merit
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selection system is not working as well as we would like. We then
need to examine whether there may be some changes in the
selection process that could have the impact for which the reforms
in Rhode Island were designed. There has been a lot of discussion
today about the role of politics in the judicial selection process. As
a preliminary matter, I want to stress what has been stated by
other participants here, that politics per se is not the problem.
Politics is an integral part of all judicial selection processes, either
an electoral system or some type of merit selection system. I
believe that there is nothing at all wrong with that, and in fact
politics is a necessary component, if we want some type of
accountability in the process. However, there is a difference
between politics, and political patronage and cronyism.
As one example of an alternative process which could provide
some guidance in Rhode Island, I want to consider the federal
judicial selection system. As we all know, Article III judges are
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The
phase of the federal selection process on which I wish to focus is
not confirmation, which, particularly in the case of Supreme Court
nominees, often involves dramatic televised hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Instead, I want to discuss the part
of the process that occurs before any hearings, when Senators
identify potential judicial candidates, whose names they then
submit to the President for consideration and possible nomination.
In addition, I am concentrating not on Supreme Court
nominations, which are selected more directly by the President,
but on candidates for the lower federal courts, where home state
Senators have more involvement in the selection process. There
are a variety of systems for the selection of these lower court
judicial candidates, but most common is that the Senator of the
party to which the President belongs is given the responsibility of
identifying and submitting potential nominees to the President. It
is clearly a political process in that the Senator's political party
has a significant impact in determining his or her role in selection.
However, that doesn't mean that the process necessarily involves
political cronyism.
Though Senators utilize many different systems, the growing
trend has been for Senators to formalize the process by using some
type of nominating committee, or advisory panel, to screen
For example, Senators from seventeen
potential candidates.
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states use nominating committees to evaluate candidates for
federal judicial positions. 7 Other states have established similar
procedures, such as Virginia, where Senators ask state bar
associations to provide recommendations for federal court
vacancies. 8
Moreover, in many instances, these nominating committees
and advisory panels are quite nonpartisan. In Colorado, Senators
have formed a bipartisan ten-member advisory panel. 9 In Illinois,
Senator Durbin has formed three bipartisan committees to screen
and recommend candidates for federal judicial positions in the
Northern, Central, and Eastern Districts of the state. 10 The
Senators from Ohio created two bipartisan judicial advisory
commissions to recommend candidates for U.S. District Court
judgeships.11
Specifically to avoid conflicts of interest,
commission members residing in the Southern District of Ohio
evaluate applicants for the Northern District, while members
residing in the Northern District screen Southern District
applicants.1 2 In Vermont, Senators Leahy and Sanders have
assembled a nine member panel to recommend candidates for
federal judgeships in the state. 13 Each Senator appoints three of
those members and the remaining three are appointed by the
Vermont Bar Association.
This Vermont Judicial Selection
7. These states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,

Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Federal

Judicial Selection: Federal Judicial Nominating Commissions,

AMERICAN

JUDICATURE
SOCIETY,
available
at
http://www.judicialselection.us/federaljudicial-selection/federaljudicialno
minating-commissions.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
8. Id.
9. Id.

10. Press Release, Durbin Announces Bipartisan Screening Committees
for Federal Judges, U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Marshalls, April 27, 2009,
availableat http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseld=312019.

11.
U.S.

Press Release, Brown, Voinovich Announce Nomination Process for
District
Judgeships,
April
27,
2009,
available
at

http://brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/release/?id=92033778-d2cO496b-bba3-8dd961eb41f5.
12. Id.

13. Press Release, Leahy And Sanders Announce Merit Commission To
Screen Candidates For Federal Judgeships In Vermont, Feb. 26, 2009,
availableat http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/release/?id=5a2e215
f-f0c9-4f80-ala7-a6fada8d3adf.
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Commission, which is described as nonpartisan, appears to
represent a variety of legal constituencies. 14 The membership of
the Commission includes corporate lawyers, a plaintiffs' lawyer,
representatives from public interest organizations, a Justice on
the State Supreme Court, the former president of the Vermont
Bar Association, and the Dean of Vermont Law School. There are
three female and six male members. 1 5
Wisconsin's federal nominating commission has been in
existence since 1979.16 The eleven member commission is chaired
by the Dean of either the University of Wisconsin Law School, or
Marquette University Law School, depending on where the
vacancy is located. The two Deans co-chair the commission to
consider candidates for a position on the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.17 Two members of the commission are appointed by the
State Bar of Wisconsin.18 When both Senators are of the same
political party as the President, each Senator appoints four
members to the nominating commission for federal judicial
vacancies. However, when only one Senator is of the same party
as the President, that Senator appoints five members, while the
Senator of the other party appoints three members. When both
Senators belong to a political party different from that of the
President, each Senator appoints two members, and the most
senior elected official in the state from the President's party
appoints four members.19
Of course, the federal system differs from the state judicial
selection process, but there may be components of the federal
system from which Rhode Island could borrow. These examples
from the various federal nominating committees reveal a depth of
representation from the public interest sector, as well as the

14. Id. It was not possible to determine the race or ethnicity of the
membership based on the information provided.
15. California's committee includes a retired federal judge, a former state
appellate judge, the President of the Hispanic Bar Association, corporate
lawyers, public interest lawyers, and a law professor.
16. Press Release, Kohl, Feingold Announce Activation of Wisconsin
Federal Nominating Commission, Aug. 6, 2009, available at

http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel-dataPagelD_146
4=3020.
17. Id.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
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corporate bar. There is a range of constituencies represented and
as far as can be determined, there appears to be diversity in
membership in a number of areas. The membership of the
commissions is not appointed solely by the political branches. Bar
associations have a role in the process and there is use made of
former judges or judges from other systems, as well as deans from
area law schools. All of these aspects of the examples in the
federal system could be replicated in Rhode Island. This could
create a nominating commission that truly was nonpartisan,
representative and diverse in many ways, and which also
appeared to be so. Even within a political process, a judicial
selection system does not have to be entirely politically-based, and
it can make room for a variety of voices. While the make-up of a
nominating commission does not necessarily dictate the
characteristics of the judicial candidates it puts forward, clearly it
can impact the selection process. In addition, it has the potential
to change the perception of the system, as well as strengthen the
confidence that the Bar and the public have in the judicial
selection process.
The studies produced by the panelists today demonstrate that
it is very difficult to break free from the taint of political
corruption and patronage in judicial selection - whether actual
corruption or patronage continues or not. Politicization has very
long and indirect consequences, even where it no longer is
prevalent and a judicial selection system has been reformed. As I
have explained, it may create a "holdover effect" which impacts
the number and quality of applicants interested in pursuing a
judicial position. It may even impact the depth and quality of the
Bar as a whole, because attorneys may be less interested in
practicing in a jurisdiction where the judiciary is perceived to be
the product of such patronage. The quality and diversity of the
Bar then in turn affects the quality of judicial candidates.
Therefore, political patronage, whether existing in reality or
perception, creates a cycle in judicial selection from which it can
be difficult to escape.
It is critical that the judicial selection process have both
legitimacy and the appearance of legitimacy. This is important
not only to ensure the quality of our judges, but more broadly, to
guarantee that the public has confidence in the entire process of
Our governmental system rests upon public
government.
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acceptance of judicial decision-making, 20 which can only be
assured when judicial selection is fair and is perceived to be fair.
This lends urgency to our responsibility to investigate the
meaning of the findings from the studies discussed today. We
need to obtain more information on the process as it is actually
working and we need to address both the real and the perceived
flaws of the current system now - to strengthen our judges, our
Bar, and the public's support.

20. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1787, 1787 (2005).

